Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ab144a06aa729bc1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.9 KB Created: 2021-09-13 11:30:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: 3e1c66d4a05a8d5bc524201aed3ef0ab SHA-1: 1c67447325e1cd140989441e313da327741a4c68 SHA-256: ab144a06aa729bc147d014983716535df9577c2cde4f3a8eb84abfa9905678cb
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a link farm pointing to multiple compromised websites, suggesting an attempt to trick users into downloading a secondary payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. The presence of embedded JavaScript (T1059.007) is a common technique for initiating malicious actions within PDFs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9981

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://smidgel.ru/uplcv?utm_term=legacy+episode+4+english+subtitles PDF link annotation
    • https://www.karavanlakesfet.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/43ca2d93803902a236d8ce334f9924af/ponalunogubavitugada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pyroglobal.sk/app/webroot/files/userfiles/files/63568005890.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://villaturri.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16135f490d2d6e---nudafusogixuvitapi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://winpoasia.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zojinufefeso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aodaixuan.vn/app/webroot/upload/image/files/39610429377.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://florerialafloresta.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/64483345698.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://autofactory-jin.com/js/upload/files/tafafevifamidefifaxenedek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gelateriacool.it/userfiles/files/zepelubipupuwegixibig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.marbelitesa.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613036c542b0a---27460505629.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.alwaysflorida.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16132a824b8aab---44399174913.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.info-service.com.tw/plugin/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/laxaxorugavuwobukemex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://goldfieldssanddrags.com.au/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wotobagonukenadapusozuzej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://puertoestereo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ji8mtpuk43aul00tlvc19ct626/9506398637.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jaurrieta.net/USERFILES_JAURRIETA/files/mofuwidapali.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ticaproduce.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/34758172595.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ist-lb1.istanajp.com/contents/files/xogarizu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn----7sbbbizu2bxaod.xn--p1ai/userfiles/file/bekugepebixefej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://csc0351.com/userfiles/file/20210903045141_p8ixhu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://998.geektic.com/geektic/files/xozagujevividarik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kirilmazbardak.com/userfiles/file/42577037392.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://liavanhaeringen.nl/userfiles/files/xixararumagawovemefo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://napiarsaigh.com/images/sisanajewu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d8eb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD8EB 18412 bytes
SHA-256: 571d00652d9a6e005925505f478fa3d6c25359a0c2d031c8d361eedee407a930
font_01_sfnt_off00010899.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10899 11084 bytes
SHA-256: 68956eaee34139d471924dd7b60f3ee2465b862a64d38851af8be6be15ab078e
font_02_sfnt_off000121fc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x121FC 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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