Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aaf9bf42db51e7de…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.6 KB Created: 2021-01-16 05:32:33 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: f51a5892d1483487e20892dd42edc8e8 SHA-1: 7f773c3606fcbd0307dc270f56804606072e07b0 SHA-256: aaf9bf42db51e7defb22ef18e263de7b407ed2cc372a60bd5defbcd63e055cf1
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by multiple heuristics and a machine learning classifier. It contains numerous embedded URLs, with at least one identified as a redirector to known malicious infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, appears to be related to unit conversions, likely a lure to disguise the malicious links. The presence of multiple disposable hosting domains and redirectors suggests a phishing or malware distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?utm_term=14.1+ounces+to+lbs In PDF document text
    • https://site-1173675.mozfiles.com/files/1173675/mufodogez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vekuperik/gcgjggh/zodaketugorojilaporanujaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369162/normal_5fa46d6975cee.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vowibesep/tibNhj6/93488495860.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pozategon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695347/1458479.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wigufigavotafo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452860/zorowuko-migitar-mimigiwet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gidufulelav/cgjibha/blockly_games_maze_9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mamulexujixi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135390653/jadut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kajukijuxuvame.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135329863/b66584f74de.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/ruxuvedije/ohihjgc/gagozukeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fenazijeguk/gjAjihd/pinaro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379732/normal_5f8d04edab41f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fitisasituwag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134846324/kanuridupifidifamiza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kugodago.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134491336/916016.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cc86.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCC86 4704 bytes
SHA-256: 376ea8014abd052f4f0bea17d021cb71af232acc5fdfd89ae8914b0365a4c831
font_01_sfnt_off0000dcaa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDCAA 10952 bytes
SHA-256: 3b870f38a76ac21400572feec645effab6c63d53f85cbe0426b9e47aa48af5a7

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.