RTF malware analysis — malicious · aae3e2b4dccf14d2

MALICIOUS

RTF

369.8 KB Created: 2019-01-20 14:19:00 First seen: 2019-12-10

MD5: c52315591ed975ef3da437dc7b9a51a4 SHA-1: 7c2742018ca46b4decc5f9ec50579488202b71dc SHA-256: aae3e2b4dccf14d241e830b586925a73e71f7a137cb782039c3067e1974b6790

202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation, specifically related to Equation Editor and MSXML SAX OLE activation (CVE-2017-8759). The presence of OLE object data and the ".objupdate" directive strongly suggest that the file is designed to trigger an exploit. The extracted artifact "objdata_02_off0004e993.bin" contains shellcode API strings, indicating it's likely a payload dropper. The benign URL found is not considered a threat IOC.

Heuristics 6

Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759

RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0003f147.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F147	8592 bytes
SHA-256: `67ff0449c56810ed91342d38f4bcc93b13e25946a55d6fed92fc2708e3e82c64`
`objdata_01_off00043517.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x43517	18067 bytes
SHA-256: `a3e7372dca209f1cbac26af28260150afb4f6a02e082cffed2ec9d194591e0b0`
`objdata_02_off0004e993.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4E993	16866 bytes
SHA-256: `bff5d7e84accb8a0746146b97eadb6acf9f1a9a6ea38b017497202cc98c911f9`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY, SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD, SC_PEB_ACCESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryW, GetProcAddress, URLDownloadToFileW, ExitProcess

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