Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aad283b87a77847b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

124.1 KB Created: 2021-08-24 23:16:47 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: 55633117d837fe17175d937ebf9da876 SHA-1: b9efceaa977da1a7de6a6293e89928b174c56139 SHA-256: aad283b87a77847b68d4b98ceee1960ccbd3ad4548097b3c72ff8f62b70bf700
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, supported by numerous heuristics flagging the PDF as a link farm pointing to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting. The document body is heavily obfuscated, but the heuristics suggest a lure involving urgency, invoices, or callback phishing. The embedded URLs likely lead to malicious or phishing sites, consistent with a spearphishing attachment attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9883

Heuristics 8

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://infrive.ru/uplcv?utm_term=aphonopelma+chalcodes+for+sale PDF link annotation
    • http://skisun.it/userfiles/files/fowolabuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://clubforeducation.com/FCKeditor/userfiles/file/vozumubuped.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://accuratesearch.com/userfiles/file/ligugememiji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.nationaalgolfcongres.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160fc68fd2234b---6977804447.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://conservationenergy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bb56774861e---tavugawikekorefosa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.rlktechniek.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c933a4060c---lezubid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://johnlillylaw.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/veratejetovupesopeki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://formel1vermietung.de/userfiles/file/lifagijosapavoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wpsqld.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/064861c28d92d01763a9934fa1a8386d/30682924977.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alihuata.com/userfiles/file/94317898605.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.carolglassman.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160fd9ee8caed9---dewimi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://marsalanoleggio.it/userfiles/files/26613860560.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tele-video.ru/upload/files/90843722161.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.trimbleexpress.sk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607987b71ac6c---xorekukuxelidekodi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aggengr.com/uploads/CMS/file/xagajawajesolusilisaneb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.majoriscambio.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a056a416ae4---rirosugomuvelineninis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://genesislighting.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/19884bd48ca97ecd24a443406c8d3596/zopaluzukuviposujipep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://greenturtleproductions.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b79791b9b929bce2f5f1657084261a83/75463513397.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pypconsultores.mx/userfiles/file/11374108725.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://macleanpinesdrivingschool.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/da01893203446a6cb40cc325f4f701b2/17788096568.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agatanorek.com/files/file/25569682640.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.prodomasa.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xupoxelutemivotevibem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00017e20.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x17E20 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00019632.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x19632 18920 bytes
SHA-256: 2b0d41745a69f89cfffeeb16e746e8b2464f53bc02d2bd7ae84bfe415645896f
font_02_sfnt_off0001c8f7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1C8F7 10676 bytes
SHA-256: 2bee16728aec225e652f20b83ad864907bc1a7150809b27c984a5bfc4525e1f4

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