Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aab943e96c50c689…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.2 KB Created: 2021-01-04 01:21:44 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: b2b14e7cefddc937163d49c8f1b8b600 SHA-1: d26d95e6e13e1f51d8a92e9208638311b1e46abb SHA-256: aab943e96c50c689916bb72d64aafbfe1d045b62577a36479e53a0283a47cf83
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links to a known malicious redirector, traffking.ru, which is a strong indicator of malicious intent. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection further support this assessment. The document body appears to be heavily obfuscated or corrupted, but the presence of a download button lure and the link farm heuristic suggest a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/aws?utm_term=amiga+emulator+rom In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xojurolaruk/ioPjbfj/41569256133.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jenogisemelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303080/lulawulogozejuregide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jifedibodo/1iU8EJQ/lexifit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zapakolozu/io03Phg/95089014673.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://safipeta.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408280/8981074.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ziziwatir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134713039/cbf84be22c7e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://naxaludegefow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134776308/ramatugase.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dizakevusarebiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134581037/pozabupiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vatipasa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775610/5931567.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fadupazageraf/98394043376.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zuses/upsc_2016_answer_key_insights.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f26ac363-20a1-4874-b357-d7896d58defa/bseb_10th_exam_form_date_2020.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/310d5240-7caf-4bbe-8bf0-f4431e18b825/small_cargo_trailers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xamibebulosaxug/gipodaburu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c738.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC738 4816 bytes
SHA-256: ff1161a615c291fce00bccac50611a4165159906f568dd6c5c9500bd90568fdc
font_01_sfnt_off0000d781.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD781 10592 bytes
SHA-256: 7c35654ae25f4adf511a4531e16353c399c048067344dff06af63f6e850aa573

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