Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aa7fb9b69e685795…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.6 KB Created: 2021-02-22 21:23:56 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 2dd5bf771ecafda0c2eed48d1f823178 SHA-1: 2240aa139ed4093d25c22fd841308ce089b0a36c SHA-256: aa7fb9b69e685795a8f96bd5714c8ae1910326d3d8dc8f45f72081840b7d1b19
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains an embedded script and exhibits heuristics related to embedded script payloads and command execution lures. The document body and heuristics suggest a social engineering tactic to trick users into running commands, potentially leading to the download of further malicious content from the identified URLs. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seumenha.ru/aws?utm_term=can+i+use+powershell+instead+of+cmd PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fudimesa/aghtIEF/danefigigiru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hangookoil.ru/67539127670dx4n7.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://lorenbayi.com/nikalimipiwukokewixet1x6dh.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://salonlabs.xyz/welukemalofidufijugrd1k6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://requiredjokblog.com/anarchy_online_agent_guide_2018a4g1k.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4473039/normal_600dd84455057.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://busforpay.online/how_to_exercise_the_gluteus_maximus_musclefq6vb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nupasoxure/jgmZ4gd/poached_eggs_in_oven.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.coIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/levovod/98976100977.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tinezedu/lotr_gondor_theme_sheet_music.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dapekufoxiraku/gadeneruvaweverere.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zalomi/38047264089.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dalava/xupovonevoledajubifuvudi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vavejijitatofu/dagepuzuwogiverusami.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gofiguj/simple_past_tense_form_of_do.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00013124.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x13124 1620 bytes
SHA-256: a6cf0f45bd24c37cef99b9516ac56c354b2c8dd470eab3e7f63935481d1ad7e5
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='OpenOffice.org'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Vocuyegi Badohomi</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Can i use powershell instead of cmd. PowerShell and the command line are built-in command-line tools in Windows, and both are accessible </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Can i use powershell instead of cmd. PowerShell and the command line are built-in command-line tools in Windows, and both are accessible </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Can i use powershell instead of cmd</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='OpenOffice.org'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-06T01:52:49'
  xmp:CreatorTool='OpenOffice.org'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='e78d33fa-613d-48bc-a9eb-ed9d7c512566'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='75b18448-1994-4e10-9b80-3111087025f5'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000ea8e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA8E 5392 bytes
SHA-256: c30d1ddb7bfa881d509ed96e431aa9631534ec51a75d057ea0721b280b08afef
font_01_sfnt_off0000fccb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFCCB 13676 bytes
SHA-256: f0d5abc4103f93f60f52e0efa4befd56f5451a32b731e9ae6f84a7982a87a914

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