Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aa7100ba6a14eebb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

10.2 KB
MD5: 01c8f989db53ea3a342cc16ede71e06f SHA-1: 7a0ef72742619c51572ab7f0f98303639e3c79ce SHA-256: aa7100ba6a14eebb2f4907c77148eb37bac111e0dfbb53a1e86ada480cd61a62
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF file contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded OLE object is intended to be activated automatically. This suggests the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload, likely via PowerShell given the common use of this technique with Equation Editor exploits.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000111d.bin
43d69c95ed2f671b09b0127a4ca36e7d66ba66a56d08aec30769481319dbd75e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x111D 1836 bytes