Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aa6267e925fa1ffe…

MALICIOUS

RTF

100.6 KB First seen: 2024-08-22
MD5: a9413df0cfdac99cdba5f57e62e5af76 SHA-1: c6efb0920290d318744703df1d27f7a49b319605 SHA-256: aa6267e925fa1ffe5039509f5d0924ca61e261953f8b3cd7ff6b3f680f9a630f
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, triggering the exploit. This technique is commonly used to download and execute further malicious stages.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001c32.bin
a71cce7ca98759af28f46e38be4d29ca227ec6fe469fb88706bd2c468bf7a1fc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C32 2039 bytes