Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aa61d7e7a1009e5a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

38.7 KB First seen: 2023-05-25
MD5: 546d1acfb459a73036e392e5b0d2ec4e SHA-1: 9ffc288b56b7c4aeb277e51cdbe0eee09c4ff334 SHA-256: aa61d7e7a1009e5a8f3bb77448176ab7cfed35c0ad32f35ad581a2993b88a4ff
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The presence of the ".objupdate" directive indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. The document body contains a lure related to marketing management, which is a common tactic to trick users into opening and interacting with malicious documents.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004f77.bin
4da56a5d63c42eb0f9fe740bcdedaa5668efba9770464d1fb7dcb2154510f87c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4F77 1729 bytes