Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aa4aaf675694501a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

17.1 KB Created: 2021-05-24 19:58:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 1d8aa0b27989b23885ed13c84deea6ff SHA-1: 708bc98c3135b75a9b91649088fabd78d55e9b28 SHA-256: aa4aaf675694501a5a872a79d8355b177b42016af74254785f091d710c9d284d
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1071.001 Application Layer Command Execution T1566.001 Phishing

The analysis reveals a VBA project embedded within the OOXML document, coupled with an 'Document_Open' macro and a 'Shell()' call. The 'Shell()' function is a strong indicator of malicious intent, as it allows the execution of external commands. The document likely attempts to download and execute a secondary payload via a URL, potentially a PowerShell script or a command-line interpreter. The presence of VBA macros and the shell execution strongly suggest a macro-based downloader or a technique to establish a command-and-control channel.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — context-specific rules above attribute URLs they actually evaluated; this rule lists URLs that were present in the bytes but were not otherwise tied to a specific finding.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
582e316e8770a56b6c49055e7e113f9a5d65cff94f45ffa6d14f5ed4e73ad6e1		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1406 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
489395e8b4d0727de874e1c6da1e7ef03063569d96b476f4fcc253cef10a5e12		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10752 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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