Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aa412f53e95ec8a6…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.4 KB First seen: 2026-06-22
MD5: 4940e605eab8bc84caf6eadd082879e7 SHA-1: 093bf64134ba851b246556ce2c2d16e4743e7dce SHA-256: aa412f53e95ec8a6cd8019363ac868175579c040182163a16007e056d906dc7c
160 Risk Score

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000109.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x109 1389 bytes
SHA-256: 385c340bc7585699e07aaf84849eded09c732a2024c265ece02aacf3b0d67a76