Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aa2473d32c2595bc…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

571.3 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: add4c99580676bc6cc8c02a3fe3ed6ae SHA-1: 1ec968ebf4b946a061f0ab2a2dcfdf63d8cfb8f1 SHA-256: aa2473d32c2595bc1bc10d9f85ffdcf1559622061fad666d1e54cff7c53b9f88
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759) to trigger OLE object activation. This indicates an attempt to execute embedded malicious code, likely for downloading and running a secondary payload. The presence of OLE object data and explicit OLE activation triggers strongly supports this attack vector.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00087d85.bin
6b5da9f8af13bd180ef8f3e4738bb23dee079c0d8d5a9a7ccddb15626ea48b64
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x87D85 3739 bytes