Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aa0eaa5d9c3d0632…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

16.0 KB Created: 2022-11-30 14:08:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-12-01
MD5: d110002b1fc1ffb8265e0b10f9e05013 SHA-1: b3e7eec3f8770449ac4d2c724a85dca66601d686 SHA-256: aa0eaa5d9c3d0632486c2de49aaf3e40bb1d7a8fcb434761abebaa0d7cd04598
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a Document_Open VBA macro that uses GetObject to execute a command. This command utilizes PowerShell to download a second-stage executable from 'https://transfs.sh/g/JQJU3c/fdrstrgh.exe' and save it to 'C:\Users\Public\fdjk483u9rey89t53e.exe', then executes it. The ClamAV detection further confirms the malicious nature of the file.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10008068-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10008068-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlst
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
bd0c418e4e4c7c844e3beb6a828c5878942ae7557c5715235d90b07d5b58510b		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1041 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
07176e31cff8ea553455acaf2c9b7f7fcf831b0bf97d4cf9e4053e27952b02d9		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 8704 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10008068-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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