Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a9dfd5d009424aca…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

96.5 KB First seen: 2022-08-06
MD5: 030cb2389e56f3dae9631f3744969940 SHA-1: 95dee9bb6632cc17bb107c4eccb5988def3d26b5 SHA-256: a9dfd5d009424acabe4ac79ce0dd063056fc6489a551b21c7575dc51e79bae80
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1071.001 Web Protocols: Web Protocols T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an encrypted Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability allows the document to load a remote resource via a URL Moniker, which is specified as http://jmcglone.com@slinker.me/bZ. This mechanism is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://jmcglone.com@slinker.me/bZ

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