Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a9ddc83b5b3f4007…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.5 KB Created: 2020-11-06 19:15:13 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: b030cd3a8a9f085b61da1f097289aa74 SHA-1: 32b7cd424eb05199ad9ccb1d845630071dad45a3 SHA-256: a9ddc83b5b3f4007ed6547d13ebe98cfd9f651900a6b8d0a03255f7bdb12d4fd
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and redirectors, indicating a link farm or phishing attempt. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure at 'https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=jordan+peterson+youtube-channel'. While no scripts were extracted, the structure and embedded URLs strongly suggest a malicious intent to redirect users to harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=jordan+peterson+youtube-channel In PDF document text
    • https://fasuwilobavofe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134489762/zegolapewetakexed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fujimerikav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134307110/fonalusaze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://megadezatesaram.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776649/sukuta_poduzazoxozewan_juxogegama.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lefedatit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776734/4743978.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zavisedifigi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316550/3925970.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mupibidegupek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874042/5865926.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kupejofep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134589233/58b84a6dab6d11.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rulakufip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134489053/9843607.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kavivapepegag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235540/tixojitesamoze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vumusubivabup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134491869/758347.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://derejesi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134388634/3980018.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dawerofe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134361643/06b70530bc2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://fimalul.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/xenikefeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2d673f36-78d1-4d2e-b242-69cdbdb23ef2/tadudabegivijez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gojifededub.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/ziziraduxixunox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011748.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11748 5424 bytes
SHA-256: e44b9b31a036c6efe815704716127956ad1a56a8d640157549ffaadce6886e5e
font_01_sfnt_off000129b6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x129B6 11708 bytes
SHA-256: 3711516fe9ca5eb5fd4571e1bb3012883e9942bf06604e57a09116774a797856