RTF malware analysis — malicious · a9c933f65d72dfa0

MALICIOUS

RTF

87.0 KB First seen: 2024-07-30

MD5: 692201af11c88bd4609ca5476b5aa8fb SHA-1: 4d40bb5f52dab9183165c75495361eda687fd5e0 SHA-256: a9c933f65d72dfa02fb0b94476c360777cea47f0bcb36c2ec696135ca5ddad9e

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic suggests that the embedded OLE object is automatically activated upon opening. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware, often leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000141b.bin` `dcf45eb781335884183a9e78305d4cab6eb40d79758f5eaca5b82ac4a2fd3743`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x141B	1856 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.