Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a9a1ba9af5a25451…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.9 KB Created: 2021-06-02 19:12:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: fdb22d29040ea11b09af2b57dd67c300 SHA-1: 20e0485a2157e1189c73b7b26f760e63732ac90e SHA-256: a9a1ba9af5a25451f0037f37e428ffc3f6940cedc8629de1d6119eb94ad6503d
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO poisoning tactic. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URLs point towards an attempt to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/pbw?utm_term=how+to+make+a+countersink+hole+in+wood
    • https://gebifafotuzuwi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135324040/c5d0c72d9.pdf
    • https://xufuluzigi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266078/2858051.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4444356/normal_602c62a33b1f7.pdf
    • https://wironutoti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739747/1058954.pdf
    • https://dadixuva.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134018012/5fa3460bfda524.pdf
    • https://fanavepuru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871984/5b58e3969e.pdf
    • https://zemojedi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135333580/517442.pdf
    • https://sudiseva.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134470115/xiruxeju.pdf
    • https://surupipenip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856971/mekomemamol-zebeguxigapetef-gebududafexo.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4446165/normal_603765eb44e37.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4414487/normal_602128ab31923.pdf
    • https://detidigem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134491675/73399.pdf
    • https://wivirupi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134666213/98b903d54e6659.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4379841/normal_5ff6a69ee162c.pdf
    • https://mesenogixu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134736765/c444321cc0f.pdf
    • https://neburaguvud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134477844/1506571.pdf
    • https://govexofube.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872198/fivobedi-fovebigo.pdf
    • https://xufiridib.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135346556/573d8dc0e41b1cd.pdf
    • https://gexawagezawa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682787/tajipexejumox.pdf
    • https://vematonejos.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383464/72b7f.pdf
    • https://katifakemu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381151/1290868.pdf
    • https://revelamedif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437508/tunut.pdf
    • https://xopekasas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134748476/xawejojeriz.pdf
    • https://viluvaxev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135974466/pemulifi_lazegogijojib.pdf
    • https://bajiwemijowulu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135990815/9131493.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ef80.bin
402e8f1427351f7aeb8b7469579fe9f4419ade6eddf3649f5386fbeffab8d48a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF80 5296 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001015e.bin
9364f9ea1434054359456e3d1678d344324a329cb155387b4f632e61f9971332		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1015E 10556 bytes

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