Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a96045acf34d07de…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

890.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-07
MD5: 75382de01db15ae57622cfbdc48749c7 SHA-1: 8302c50ace964a0f906107bfe095e85552672020 SHA-256: a96045acf34d07de7f0f05b0648b7f910ee7af15c880c407a393a6c42c271248
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The presence of an OLE object containing this exploit payload strongly suggests the file is designed to leverage this vulnerability. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body appears to be a generic purchase order, providing no direct clues to the payload's ultimate goal.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
382fc1344a2f0cf6eda18645d41def8d571debc6637bc7fe02a5c83715a51bef
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2112 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
4cd2710b556b4677b79d216630148d3c73d88ce843715ea4a76fd9ce982db254
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0153A16D/OlE10nAtiVE 1903 bytes