MALICIOUS
340
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
The OOXML document utilizes an altChunk to import an RTF file named 'Slovakia.rtf'. This RTF file contains OLE objects that are updated via \objupdate and include excessive hex data, notably a PE header. The critical heuristic 'OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF_AUTOUPDATE_PE' indicates that this embedded executable object is auto-updated, strongly suggesting a mechanism for delivering and executing a payload. The presence of a PE header within the RTF object points to the embedded artifact being a portable executable.
Heuristics 9
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED(in altChunk RTF word/Slovakia.rtf) RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTFDocument inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
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PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX(in altChunk RTF word/Slovakia.rtf) Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
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altChunk RTF auto-updates embedded executable object critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF_AUTOUPDATE_PEOOXML document imports an embedded RTF through altChunk; the RTF contains OLE object data, forces object update, and carries a hex-encoded PE payload. This is a stronger compound exploit-loader shape than a generic altChunk RTF wrapper, but it is not tied to a single CVE unless the nested RTF object primitive also matches one.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE(in altChunk RTF word/Slovakia.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX(in altChunk RTF word/Slovakia.rtf) RTF contains ~1505KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA(in altChunk RTF word/Slovakia.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB(in altChunk RTF word/Slovakia.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
- http://opendope.org/conditions
- http://opendope.org/questions
- http://opendope.org/components
- http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin679ec25fa4b8cc637d22f74d83988a2466736a39e817dd5f32ff4bea9afe3d02 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 | 765674 bytes |
objdata_01_off00185018.bin31e3bdb4635082b6f5401bd7688a1baf90019932fe37de5dee9246f0964b7ef4 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x185018 | 584266 bytes |
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