Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a9457644d3fc78f6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

340.8 KB First seen: 2021-09-17
MD5: c3fdc25933804929491d1863ad1522e8 SHA-1: 52ea3c6c0252f2a487cf57ac49de70d7353b2df2 SHA-256: a9457644d3fc78f67028d464fde1bd0d943ba75db2714a85009afa1055463751
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updating objects, which are designed to activate when the document is opened. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates that the document likely instructs the user to enable macros or content, a common social engineering tactic to bypass security measures. This setup strongly suggests the document is a dropper intended to execute a secondary payload upon user interaction.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
555b698bd18088503366ae725d0b9c992895552645318fd6d638093ca7bf062f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 75561 bytes
objdata_01_off00026ff4.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x26FF4 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off00028597.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x28597 12297 bytes