Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a9402c31f71e1a38…

MALICIOUS

RTF

47.2 KB First seen: 2020-09-15
MD5: 9ddfe67208fe70d8cecb0eab58f63681 SHA-1: cef84e3496063500a74831827a324cf8257416ff SHA-256: a9402c31f71e1a38fc7869838b9cfc3009e9e28dd1fb7b238187ef53dcfd300c
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor, a known vector for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882. The presence of ".objdata" and "\objupdate" directives strongly indicates an attempt to trigger code execution upon opening. This is a common method for delivering malicious payloads via spearphishing attachments.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000070.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x70 18408 bytes
SHA-256: 36dfef29eb383c54dd86e8345017c3b5668761d47e7faddb0f72eec690343496

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