Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a93dcd69744c1390…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.8 KB Created: 2020-10-27 06:44:30 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 41fab18a34de0c8041258ddd31ac0825 SHA-1: d05160e695d1835dc002a8423e5f8b1d70a0fbcd SHA-256: a93dcd69744c13900da2cc3d4f98b56a3df28e90b309a8102efe300966343eeb
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting, and one specifically to a known malicious redirector. This strongly suggests a link farm or SEO poisoning attack designed to drive traffic to malicious sites. No scripts were extracted, but the embedded links are the primary attack vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=student+research+proposal+example+apa In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374953/normal_5f9549c21bac1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367674/normal_5f8981d4ca061.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4378620/normal_5f8cf650687da.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xopigitit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134339451/xutojumasonan-xanoru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lejigatoni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871980/9050911.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jutawalafomas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316275/figimegixori_dunuxanate_rijuvi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jovikuveditowe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874612/1359114.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382638/normal_5f9239917c5ae.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412158/normal_5f976d30aaa9d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366337/normal_5f875ea7e42ff.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://luwiritogejoti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266422/8709810.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rakevuxex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134040666/e6d85a7d1b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/domegagowevag/the_hindu_nationalist_movement_in_india.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lulelepese/77974082786.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fasanag/zuvaditifug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007841.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7841 5484 bytes
SHA-256: ab01a6c433b4ed06932d08c6a9e1998f31d56180a69dbd753e040c8599734c7e
font_01_sfnt_off00008ab0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8AB0 10672 bytes
SHA-256: 87abafc0d53b1489aaa0a6b4aaf3b1888985ca13407ab932b6f72f1f7ac9ff94

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