Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a8f4da2076bc0026…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.01 MB
MD5: 25af535599ad3e48d6b4713f8e599871 SHA-1: a293b85372f9b0ffdacb46af40518f1341ddc248 SHA-256: a8f4da2076bc00264891bc7872e70f245f47807c268fb921fc135b711c817b34
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The presence of OLE object data and the ".objupdate" directive further suggest that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated, likely to trigger the exploit. This pattern is commonly used to download and execute a secondary payload, hence the high confidence in this attack vector.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000dea.bin
56fa3814862f8311ec3c037524140fa03677fa60cdace0cde3f86da237c887fd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDEA 45245 bytes
objdata_01_off0002f98f.bin
a8f8fe297b9e240bebca1d0300f2afca1b0fefd86601c082b5569a106f19c96b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F98F 359082 bytes