Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a8f4c17252756baf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.4 KB Created: 2020-04-29 23:38:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: da3885d64575c74109113de72d47ad34 SHA-1: dc6c10620895ee66932d8353ec67443fb36a03ef SHA-256: a8f4c17252756baf6fe9694b7496646dff860be9c9f2453bd1185e310b5b9da3
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of external links to other PDF files hosted on various domains, a technique often used for SEO poisoning to drive traffic to malicious sites or to distribute further malware. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic confirms the presence of a link farm. No scripts were extracted, but the structure itself is suspicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://emilygurr.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874087/130874087.html#aggregate+planning+methods+pdf
    • http://kidsuniversitymarietta.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452934/2f0ab.pdf
    • http://passievoortekst.nl/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873820/jetek_boxifetuposiwaz_karun_gikuwalijowotu.pdf
    • http://2faiths1prayer.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813478/0f31c6c.pdf
    • http://ben-collie.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636974/buzuwivupifujilafexo.pdf
    • http://ebklandscaping.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130490151/95c1f9f59f9d7.pdf
    • http://lucernemobilehomepark.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776126/xubalugotamosobuf.pdf
    • http://brothersnblue.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604348/1331950.pdf
    • http://chrisdelaneymedia.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130605059/babuderobur_xawubizefe.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b1d.bin
20c7773f1b96b2211798f70a7b5fca8efcd66afff853d2722fa6bdb27fa6d285		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B1D 7528 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008872.bin
9870c884dd6e450fb42143a6e17b42e5e3dc59c66b8cad80c6eb7379339c2a6e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8872 16120 bytes

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