Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a8f08fc50148c253…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.2 KB Created: 2020-11-24 09:04:44 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 643f57d68562f4a6e568e78096dff77f SHA-1: 1b96134185b614e492450381b543582c4ccf25bb SHA-256: a8f08fc50148c253fba60535d5a5786780bfe445684b2fa7455afa56639ddcb2
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The file is a PDF containing a large number of links to external resources, many hosted on disposable domains and flagged as potentially malicious redirectors. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware through these links. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was unreadable, but the heuristic firings clearly point to a link farm used for malicious purposes.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/aws?utm_term=robbins+pathology+mcqs+with+answers+pdf
    • https://jeretidaker.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134595905/pefoxuzafixesanav.pdf
    • https://gononazenikemad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134482012/30b018d.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4389366/normal_5fab953ded24a.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372740/normal_5f899469aadd9.pdf
    • https://voxepobar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134668427/7361227.pdf
    • https://penulikadima.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482887/4497185.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368487/normal_5f9a9295c01e6.pdf
    • https://farukipem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134473356/b00994841e.pdf
    • https://kixovomez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134868331/1535809.pdf
    • https://tagekoworiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134016686/jatupinevev.pdf
    • https://tuxotakej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134524070/numesolebumepo-kapigadupitos.pdf
    • https://firedisivimi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969818/zosiwugulifuxe.pdf
    • https://gepipabatagik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134704213/vajokagetu-bavalup-zaweji.pdf
    • https://labiduto.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134584073/telizifijal_rudemopilafu_vekobonimufa.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tomaxade/enron_scandal_case_study.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xafaxotaful/airport_codes_by_state.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c742.bin
8a337e87b1ccb50e89815c997f6352ceb7001e449c1cfd80f95bab2636ec748f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC742 6036 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000dbb4.bin
0bafc550bab1e45f6e1e5e41ecf1fad7cf80b2a8aaa7119e3980c6ff15edf5ad		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDBB4 10552 bytes

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