Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a8e6c89659d1d01e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

971.4 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00 First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: 59da98ea5594b7f124e7223ae4594db3 SHA-1: 6be80b49f2aa63f305888662fdd0f1784c7e8e39 SHA-256: a8e6c89659d1d01e2be70e0fdc6d5c4b6a173d2762ddce6a8678b4e165efcb63
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that is forced to activate via \objupdate, exploiting CVE-2017-8759. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' suggests the document may also instruct the user to open a password-protected archive, likely containing the payload.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000e77ee.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE77EE 1414 bytes
SHA-256: f82d900742554d77ed9ea8e8936750b62f09cab90b7bd38bbee1545b331d2dd1

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