Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a8e60089ca10d36b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.5 KB Created: 2020-07-25 13:05:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 23d0cc9d8daede64cb95fd85c16ea71d SHA-1: 3f7e168a8ed1a6719db55ffbcb8d5857521f4d3e SHA-256: a8e60089ca10d36b6f4acd78a8de2ef6c575e580b7ba804b40458d18cc8bcd3b
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, with one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document also suggests a password-protected archive, a common method to bypass security scans. The primary malicious link identified is https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=firefox+er+extension, which likely leads to further malicious content or downloads.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=firefox+er+extension
    • http://files.namiwalksaz.org/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302970/buxow.pdf
    • http://files.ignitenetballclub.org/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857565/206eed416dafbb.pdf
    • http://files.jaketrue.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775025/lanirix.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2756/1634/files/13013403108.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2201/6934/files/nitipazufak.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/13977390730.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7508/4193/files/62826678087.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0110/1985/files/34585262764.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3174/6967/files/nodebetevudubedetubo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/tinoled.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0088/8483/files/xerowowuwolaxela.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4913/9880/files/werazokevugozinunafiroxe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4457/7178/files/63128143835.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3174/6967/f

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006af0.bin
7413ddfff50370799d119941d91b0d910f71c005dc206c39274424291b437ae5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6AF0 4332 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000079aa.bin
ff4815d1c38a1c1e5e8f7b0f3afb1efa1096b3f3fa0a2f69373da58d94c21b09		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x79AA 10380 bytes

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