Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a8dab1ffa463ef55…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.5 KB Created: 2020-09-02 15:32:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: b32b9e9432fb1bbfc2b869d98d44e86b SHA-1: bdd9c8d0255b24ba5d81f1717f199d50696a6622 SHA-256: a8dab1ffa463ef55e7c9b53751a9121ebb91839ed105b0eea04e4c61926fdde6
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious Link T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains a lure instructing the user to enable macros or editing, which is a common technique for malware delivery. It also contains a high number of embedded links, including one pointing to a known malicious redirector at 'https://ttraff.me/wix?keyword=teleperformance+application+guyana'. The presence of a link farm further suggests an attempt to distribute malicious content or manipulate search engine results.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/wix?keyword=teleperformance+application+guyana
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0494/4807/files/lisapufater.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3903/8360/files/battlestar_galactica_order.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1416/8480/files/daterejijuzeronipazol.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5632/3995/files/nimifegejuzalosovaneb.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/31968244380.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3861/2378/files/tuper_tario_tros.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/9219f8_fc2bf1d27b624b82befecb9a21208296.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_1649157441a143e9b41e4bcc65abc0a2.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/82e28d_ae7aae39d87540b68d1ab578c0a7d26c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/12745a_682ce990144b4474a18381f223ec6a8a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_f07172589b6a47b78d1a48ae354101bb.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005d6d.bin
c99731f90960de73376edb3e347bbfff44d106f869b8566728ad084946264a77
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D6D 5208 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006f19.bin
47a510ca3e02e455d90114e8c5bf4630790ca31ec2a843002b27d563915cd2fe
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6F19 10040 bytes