RTF malware analysis — malicious · a8d9a3a6180c08c7

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.5 KB First seen: 2022-04-09

MD5: 58b103b23641a9b2b58d91ab3f00f7bf SHA-1: 29d0a8d2889a39e2568fcf1b39ca71f9a6e0ddb1 SHA-256: a8d9a3a6180c08c7b77d320c54a826bfb05e14a316163a189841304b2ed61c9a

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000cd.bin` `022a0df8cf60606a0efa9c4ab7c04d9293295776a457c434014259fd33e10307`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xCD	2091 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.