Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a8b2084cbe938ee0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.9 KB
MD5: 59ef6a5bea524e39809d03fbc3f81f53 SHA-1: 53db329e6136e11e387482c972f4f8cde1792ada SHA-256: a8b2084cbe938ee083b052bbfa0ffe8a4e1c353f98e7c23ac3aa9ef8c7da5cd1
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

The PDF file exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms and LibTIFF. The heuristic firings indicate an embedded script payload within an XFA form, designed to be executed by the user opening the document. This suggests the primary attack vector is exploiting a known PDF reader vulnerability to deliver a secondary payload. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
7ed2cc5a1bfa3aad97528f03ac377ffd61a1dc666ee4fbf6a17ac0d8f25831e2
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101518 bytes