Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a89d23d004bd2a57…

MALICIOUS

PDF

141.5 KB Created: 2008-04-23 16:42:36 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 6.0 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Windows))
MD5: 8a4a3c5191a07efbea2eebda1669151c SHA-1: ee320e79a854b84717786c082a727caf28ed1107 SHA-256: a89d23d004bd2a57a4e9d589fc35f777a9277fc61bc784c083e03a77722a5e18
288 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and an embedded Windows executable payload, indicating a clear intent to deliver malware. The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2007-5659 (Collab.collectEmailInfo) strongly suggests exploitation of this vulnerability. The presence of a secondary embedded PDF with similar suspicious findings further reinforces the malicious nature of the file. The embedded executable payload is the primary indicator of the attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • PDF differential parser failed info PDF_DIFFERENTIAL_PARSE_FAILED
    The cross-check parser (pdfminer.six) failed on this file: PDF differential parser failed: PermissionError. Static heuristics still ran and any of their findings above are valid; only the differential cross-check signal is missing.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ctfmon.exe
08a4f2446b9756ff03d232dd278508e29f82ab40e06c828c9dc92b8137785ee8		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 29 at offset 0x1063 13253 bytes
javascript_obj0026_000.js
adb06aedf7bc478acf6ab546b55cd41f86afa52b0b8118772f10b011b346b302		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 26 at offset 0xA98 3428 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 17 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001e18d.pdf
a895eab1e194ba790c3fb1fb040a6115b1adf853870a3a20e8439bd07d059e13		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1E18D 21599 bytes

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