Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a86c26eae1ae2993…

MALICIOUS

PDF

94.5 KB Created: 2021-06-26 19:41:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: c1c851a79d8157c911ae0d9e2a15115a SHA-1: 9becb21fd5d5e97a69ae301e2e56ff2c573afbc2 SHA-256: a86c26eae1ae29931b0a5a1bc3fb4166042fab12adfabcf11a2536dec676992f
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links to other PDF files hosted on various domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO poisoning attack. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are consistent with techniques used to lure users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9924

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://anhuizhkj.com/upload_fck/file/2021-6-21/20210621144812866375.pdf
    • http://built.lu/userfiles/files/71787242350.pdf
    • http://www.expertnutritionadvisor.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c02ba2d4e7b---jimivev.pdf
    • https://robertbah.si/files/file/lebewilipiboneregulepe.pdf
    • http://happy-travel089.com/CKEdit/upload/files/81239236954.pdf
    • https://cualuoihoanmy.com/uploads/userfiles/file/3533960901.pdf
    • https://raljob.com/userfiles/file/zanotukegegibajotaz.pdf
    • https://www.msolartop.cz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b29ad14540---90669122492.pdf
    • http://sciencevier.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a0cf6e2e6a6---petopuvowutavoramexov.pdf
    • https://revapackers.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f1nkv4iep0gtfcgfco47vchu6p/60335855540.pdf
    • https://daleel.global/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/q648haaj3rdostc741ua93jat5/79917940246.pdf
    • https://scriptdd.com/_file/file/52129848382.pdf
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a6058ead75e---11574553693.pdf
    • http://www.greenbriarpropmgmt.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9b2ceff0a21293c6a405d0a13637a3b8/89604696842.pdf
    • https://x-software.cz/data/file/10027055272.pdf
    • https://aihr-iadh.org/uploads/FCK_files/file/fugatemejewijopemelifazu.pdf
    • http://elonsummerstorage.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606ed9bacd9c7---nusuduganutaz.pdf
    • https://www.olympusnorge.no/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f4qrpqe6uk99vut7urenq3rdmm/kejedoxamosepesagifi.pdf
    • http://www.linkkorea.co.kr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ba4ff339cd5---vetilopu.pdf
    • http://adaviestransportltd.com/userfiles/file/lewusokoroladaperedefibif.pdf
    • https://akdenizokullari.k12.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/iq0ga4a1cdlg7f75u2hafovdlb/58522538003.pdf
    • http://erkerlaender.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098337b33b88---xatabefubibiwekorutetode.pdf
    • http://yuseigachi.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d38b9bb3ce---5838550535.pdf
    • http://kraljicabih.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160873263afe49---49952194683.pdf
    • http://unipell.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a284be05db0---zejinonakow.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/1KS0DP0cxss/uplcv?utm_term=pdf+owner+password+recovery
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ef1a.bin
b4c78cc6e5c2960eab4c85e13f7ceeee32fbf3afecd474ad803e35c5d6624684		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF1A 16400 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000105a3.bin
bcb1eceeff477b7c2365f92d5c235cece451de9436e179b458320cb6cb06ad2c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x105A3 10644 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011e37.bin
051c2bef9f66a9fe945e1de723fae841f78f3f9086d29f11a1388451a44769e7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11E37 20292 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0001542c.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1542C 16792 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.