Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a85a99ac83316ab4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

536.4 KB
MD5: 240e606c6ce1eb91a5fe12ea4c606eed SHA-1: 5ec39049c101b2a6960f6f5c09dce6dd602670f3 SHA-256: a85a99ac83316ab49d1a26b8688290a5da096d274bf09fae9b7df94fe5e1ef05
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to activate embedded content. The presence of an 'enable lure' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable macros or editing to facilitate the execution of malicious code. This points to a delivery mechanism for a secondary payload, though no specific family is identifiable from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bb0.bin
14d6fc8a0ebf6ac61149e7b9119945022308af891b5a2daa5d3da371526e49f9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB0 171558 bytes
objdata_01_off00057e39.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57E39 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000593dc.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x593DC 12297 bytes