Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a85a28dcd89a333c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.43 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-12-07
MD5: c03075966f98ea5af5aed57ece9a1be4 SHA-1: 2e972f287af9ef9330a73ff0406cc532aa749080 SHA-256: a85a28dcd89a333cafeeedc8fc0f05d9a05382d48cdfd41ef89b258b27f97030
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The file is an Excel spreadsheet containing an embedded Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. The VBA macros are minimal and do not appear to contain executable code, suggesting the primary malicious functionality resides within the Equation Editor payload. The exploit likely facilitates the execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBX)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1d3b71b8c6234aace88f31f6e674b07383e015a2e68993dcd4fc2526aa470fe5
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2412 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
871c4ea71f76af0f99df9f2de112732d8df9e38b9d4064fef84d44226efb7b45
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD013B02B0/oLe10NATiVe 1185 bytes