Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a8188b4f5618953b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.7 KB Created: 2020-10-04 05:12:38 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: 5381a22d455254dd4a8ab5abe0546f82 SHA-1: 2b370786e9b3814d44814b017b92cb9fc339fab9 SHA-256: a8188b4f5618953bf2d5cf09efc8ef92674c6813d82ea65dc132d6c6ffe92950
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=nioh+dual+swords In PDF document text
    • http://bibiwew.swirl-studios.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071037/9633879.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zidadutar.coastalleadership.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407021/golaxij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.blueandwhitepotterysuenormanlondon.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607600/5928120.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://biduxokam.jlrodgers.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739069/jopig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vifem.friendsofswedehollow.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740178/b88b03e9f622848.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mewax.yoroadventures.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163717/xuwoxusepul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mississaugaquiltersguild.ca/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164442/7837849.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.yichaorui.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815388/wejode_sijodud_segasumopamuwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.shapenv.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453496/wedelum_pumukaxinopu_jogadapez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.purposecommunity.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696330/xalowuzumeli-japiluv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.spoton-marketing.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070212/lagoturodupo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.joburgkidspaces.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856435/5376714.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.valetridents.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636781/wekosa-midexugawazuga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ahmorganphotography.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437655/1868336.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.pascalletourneau.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681992/9685983.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mezfantasypublishing.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131858661/fatumebiwokuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000624c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x624C 4972 bytes
SHA-256: d25d7ab87aaacc79182a0d31ceb0ee85d8a1af3eaef52f2afe9b5beee4913ad3
font_01_sfnt_off00007340.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7340 10220 bytes
SHA-256: dccbdc54914468234d60fa55aa13110cc52e0b94f3aaf338cd6dca1f65d41145