Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a7e36d0ac37281df…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

147.3 KB
MD5: 5dee23743f7b8f14181b1e4359844ba1 SHA-1: b129ae3903f0a717a1eaae18ae05384fea7b838d SHA-256: a7e36d0ac37281dfa09250a3b2319b9870ca12072c3b9e156ef3779d63e0936b
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains OLE object data that is automatically linked and updated, indicating an attempt to execute embedded content. The heuristics suggest that this OLE object activation is the primary mechanism for delivering a payload. Without further script analysis or network indicators, the exact nature of the payload and its ultimate goal remain unclear, but the technique strongly points to a malicious attachment designed to exploit OLE functionality.

Heuristics 3

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000014aa.bin
d7b063a40ed53073ac9c498ce6ef2b475c511222905763b72b7ae7fa651fcc4b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14AA 4192 bytes