Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a7d9247c0d72f0a3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

75.7 KB Created: 2021-10-27 10:31:49 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: 348ab312786f456236264e186c08f086 SHA-1: 12061c706033ed2e95b1d0e82d752d5165a78970 SHA-256: a7d9247c0d72f0a3eaa61b3971516e495740cdcb77b0ecf4dcc3360c6831e83e
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The file contains Excel 4.0 macros, which are known to be used for malicious purposes. The macros utilize WinAPI functions like URLDownloadToFileA to download a second-stage payload from one of the provided URLs. The reconstructed path 'C:\ProgramData\YvJRMdRJJq' suggests a potential location for the downloaded payload. While the URLs themselves are marked as confirmed benign, the macro's intent to download and execute is clear.

Heuristics 4

  • Excel 4.0 macro sheet (1 sheet(s)) critical OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET
    Spreadsheet contains an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet — XLM was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022 and evaded many VBA-focused controls before Microsoft tightened XLM defaults. Even legitimate XLM use is rare in modern workbooks. The macro sheet is stored as XLSB/BIFF12 binary content, which many XML-only OOXML scanners miss.
  • Binary XLM macro sheet with WinAPI/download strings critical OOXML_XLM_BINARY_WINAPI_STRINGS
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet is stored as BIFF12/XLSB binary data and contains Win32 download or process-execution API strings such as URLDownloadToFileA, ShellExecuteA, or CreateDirectoryA. These strings are high-signal in XLM macro sheets and catch payload-download macros that XML-formula scanners cannot parse.
  • URL reconstructed from XLM cell array (3 URLs) critical OOXML_XLM_CELL_ARRAY_URL
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet stages its payload URL across individual numeric cells (one ASCII charcode per cell) or inside an embedded HTA that uses VBScript Chr()/&-concat obfuscation. The reconstructed URL is invisible to literal-bytes URL extraction because it is never contiguous in the workbook stream. URLs were recovered by walking the BIFF12 record stream of every worksheet and macrosheet part and decoding RK/inline-string cells in both row-major and column-major order.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/910251809556271117/912318014416912415/XOwuRIcuntfuck.mp4
    • https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/910251809556271117/912318020003692574/FqtFBvEOrukvcuntfuck.mp4
    • https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/910251809556271117/912318007320145940/XOftdbhXmOZcuntfuck.mp4

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
xlm_sheet_00.bin
8e7b79086375610d9e544dfef758d886e5ff5e1aec47a6b44490e73c6e30f66a
xlm-macrosheet OOXML XLM macro sheet: xl/macrosheets/sheet1.bin 5103 bytes