Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a7ca98f01ad87b08…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.4 KB Created: 2020-11-01 05:03:42 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: a80ba81a9bebd3d9691bf7ccfcb984d5 SHA-1: b1ef7c32a4298d312039864b34548a4516c79568 SHA-256: a7ca98f01ad87b081104a3863edb99157dabf151e04796e6ee0a8bc3674b4781
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable hosting services and redirector infrastructure. The primary heuristic firings indicate that this PDF is designed as a link farm, likely to distribute malware or facilitate phishing attacks. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious nature of this document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?keyword=pathfinder+amplified+rage In PDF document text
    • https://radutarogo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134379411/wafinowaguleru-xotolivebe-xewed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bimidupixujeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134319160/1fa68fc7a64a59.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jujodupif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303189/3385658.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vepezifu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265798/95003434e69f6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nevitasez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134305442/7577735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xifobosakup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815359/57e9e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lixaworone.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871871/xepivunumurevun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://besavikeneg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815808/0595f0ad25.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fupuvoriru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134494751/70dc1fb6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kagilovudugavap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164538/60a365.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0398/6184/6209/files/molifuwosabubaridiwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0503/4075/7656/files/dabebawajukekekaxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0505/1836/0250/files/all_programming_languages_and_their_uses.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vuxalirudidel/is_air_a_solution_or_heterogeneous_mixture.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0482/4956/9434/files/what_would_my_cousins_kid_be_to_me.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006464.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6464 5276 bytes
SHA-256: a2877741fa6ce531d29527fe4ad51af52cc17718fb5f08521927efc7a3086194
font_01_sfnt_off00007631.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7631 10112 bytes
SHA-256: b4eddab27238b38f511fb13d78435e2c35b02e75c18ad6f4353004187b9cf557

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