Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a7bf6c131a43a36f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.3 KB Created: 2021-09-01 10:25:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 8977d2e3f7426d382ce71f92332653b5 SHA-1: 8c0664bf70b16afca1406f3666bc403ed1fede95 SHA-256: a7bf6c131a43a36f0ea3b6b787ce4223a6ea6d6f633d41b794eb045ea17426e3
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains numerous embedded URLs, many pointing to compromised CMS upload directories, suggesting it functions as a link farm. These links likely redirect to phishing sites or further malware downloads. The PDF structure and embedded content are consistent with a malicious document designed to lure users into clicking external links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.elsecretodelolivo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16081c40e26093---29765541130.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://www.sevgiliyevideo.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16074af88b0a50---19019495702.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pooq-design.com/app/webroot/fckfiles/file/rorobomiwuvunujujuref.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://boucherienabli.com/uploads/FCK_files/file/wobataxutematunaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alltechsro.cz/files/daxopo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn----7sbakn3aoflleitf3m6a.xn--p1ai/userfiles/file/63224729089.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yorktownhs1987.com/clients/57482/File/jiluget.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.andrecampbell.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/32f657ea589538f619e712d101111e38/lowupifufuxugobeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://planningpvedh.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/9686436032.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://n2nnetworks.com/files/others/rowutiwejibazow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarmisir.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e4hdh4nkh9uo1jf1abiq43itd2/tonubarizame.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://west-holding.com/userfiles/file/73250149473.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.quatainvestimentos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f26e6b8596---59850881929.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://coalcreekcentenary.com/clients/5/52/52f735e63eff8706e1a2a73a20aef632/File/41737455813.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://arredamenticucinesiciliane.it/userfiles/files/17887556788.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://agataklimowska.pl/userfiles/file/97002686607.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bhk-aindling.com/userfiles/files/zakoxuzivuzefixivos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rideabikenews.com/user_img/files/97702641627.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://185.33.116.145/~acus01/upload/files/nobexarajebosidoxu.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://d4smontreal.com/clients/f/f5/f58105ca183540932673f5bf18e62671/File/69551064897.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mercedesmazo.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160e455fd4fcb2---23268764680.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.capitalroofingct.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bda5542e41a---76326664246.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.potterycommercials.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160795f58b6705---92120514037.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.telsercom.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b278c4c9a4d---48936224469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pwmtqatar.net/userfiles/file/xeteruvoxamujeboja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ats-dz.com/userfiles/file/fumunugefalitagowev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=munch+and+expressionismPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000bae0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBAE0 16844 bytes
SHA-256: 66c4c20a554635e92a618292a38a48f82c58c337e2f560fa3fb059f91e73a9bb
font_01_sfnt_off0000e63b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE63B 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off0000fe52.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE52 10828 bytes
SHA-256: f4629c26c3c6d1e8cc7761822e8fa3cf9b936144c7070e1be437c9fdf746f6e1

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