Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a7bec19a581b1a73…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.4 KB Created: 2021-06-27 01:13:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: abb2473f703e50d1c0f8c03ab016ea5a SHA-1: d566c504c0e530fa21f84e272a911817efdcea52 SHA-256: a7bec19a581b1a73598f48c911307e2195c3a7b763d488e67c791a7f69c61b0d
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are identified as compromised CMS uploads or disposable hosting. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware. The document body is heavily obfuscated and unreadable, providing no direct user-facing content, but the embedded URLs and heuristic firings point to a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9835

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://xoblates.com/clients/e/e0/e08cfb93fb97b00c28394d0532709dc9/File/58611803792.pdf
    • https://whitelightdesign.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/16f56ed5071b37cf030a569f73764658/7057951800.pdf
    • https://www.18fire.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e4ef0e23a36c546969de60eb5a05b58c/69903070198.pdf
    • https://schreinerheusi.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160941fd72c7a5---kupam.pdf
    • http://plenar.hr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608dcb799ff72---gagexunulex.pdf
    • https://karpzbeldowa.pl/uploads/userfiles/files/domelo.pdf
    • http://www.nowsingapore.co.id/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e52b0c2e8a---zasotidabirewekaxojilem.pdf
    • https://prtl.pl/userfiles/file/gokudogane.pdf
    • http://cupta.org/userfiles/files/20210602100346.pdf
    • https://him-home.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/722c521b0874700b735efe49446af763/luremafozijozoko.pdf
    • https://termofriz.rs//files/79774672027.pdf
    • http://ganan10.co.il/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f06f2bc9dc---nazujuxebuxawizeke.pdf
    • https://realestateconnect.pro/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/55ossusui05l0of1ploejjbg93/57889837961.pdf
    • http://nc2e.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b5c1638ff59---fusude.pdf
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a292032fb4d---pikipe.pdf
    • http://bizbecho.com/pa/trainstation/uploads/image/file/zemogovopesizat.pdf
    • http://kaplanpm.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cd1316c4130---vilozemabovaxut.pdf
    • https://motionslam.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4b23ec1cd6eef8af9aa45036d49754a9/kowepixuligapifefe.pdf
    • http://accurateverdicts.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f40c77d9ba---kotuji.pdf
    • http://smartcookieacademy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160978a1889d8e---87817799645.pdf
    • https://cruiseship.cruises/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l2pdriq3lvcjc8m8p3l0e7opl6/99527411087.pdf
    • https://webhostmurah.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a24900bd7ca---vemotozoliz.pdf
    • https://pfgmm.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c03372f3f79---rexisebuged.pdf
    • http://humanitool.ru/userfiles/file/wapip.pdf
    • http://suamayin.biz/userfiles/file/natizedawekupopej.pdf
    • https://www.properties-thassos.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4fpfmkgemq1td2pqlods17glni/siwexakenusejujarigi.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=dividing+fractions+with+negative+exponents
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001007e.bin
ea8d30bc082c95ef891c152fc539df1a86301181afe4503da741badbac0c8d37		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1007E 17328 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00012e33.bin
cef03b9bd79654e7d52e8d5afc0f8954d727c7b6e080849b2f41a42243300c4d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12E33 11108 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000147fb.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x147FB 16792 bytes

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