Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a7ab47575722f7b3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.11 MB
MD5: f62d352d05fc5048e5d6292e84b533e3 SHA-1: e09ed160d6ddd939329771464f9f2dd79ebcdc22 SHA-256: a7ab47575722f7b3ff2506255c252e88963acd8985263da6b3d7ee7537fbb2bb
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor and CVE-2017-11882. This indicates exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component of Microsoft Office. The embedded object data, when decoded, likely contains malicious code designed to execute arbitrary commands. The presence of 'Equation.3' and 'CVE-2017-11882' strongly suggests this attack vector.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
f8258041ec6f6217668ee7f4711d0587e90edc3e26f0b737dbec21088e354cdf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 35801 bytes
objdata_01_off000211bf.bin
85b2cf15343fc1833689a2ec4ef6d5b77164168bf6ebdc2025a4947145a715f2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x211BF 364253 bytes