Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a79996baab09c97a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.6 KB
MD5: e343815004b1d6ac1fb18c9cfc61e623 SHA-1: f7428df438f94ef1a553b5b5179a66e68c8d6c84 SHA-256: a79996baab09c97a6ed523b3966e6d5c6a6f57e061babbc64fe589cc864e427c
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate further indicates an attempt to force OLE activation, leading to the execution of arbitrary code via a known vulnerability. No document body text or scripts were extracted, but the heuristics strongly suggest a classic Equation Editor exploit delivery.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a1.bin
2ee8ec6de7beaee882353b72a7501a124f81d77c35f9878f9ce1b4127eb4c15d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA1 2095 bytes