Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a79100e1d34dc5bc…

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.2 KB
MD5: 04fb044011085bc906ede48c396020c5 SHA-1: 9920d6a9f294c4ab6fec91d94a0d9415f3f69ff8 SHA-256: a79100e1d34dc5bc7663008fd4dfeabe61ce52864126d6fd84bc499cd04cfeb2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) via OLE object activation. This technique is commonly used to deliver a second-stage payload. While no specific family is identified, the exploit mechanism strongly suggests a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000014af.bin
786557726d899f36834563367e74f08490228a3db339c47e4af8d65ea4ca903f		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14AF 1501 bytes

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