RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · a78a98114aa38aad

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

309.5 KB

MD5: 67464f5b97f1cabed2e1f05c0e327bf9 SHA-1: 35e1a577ae7b7b129b3bfedc54c1671d8a6518bc SHA-256: a78a98114aa38aadcc153a6a075b20e393cac059486ab26df9f1904458860384

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating the use of ".objupdate" and composite monikers, which are commonly used to bypass security controls and execute embedded payloads. The document body explicitly prompts the user to 'Enable Editing', a typical lure for macro-based or OLE-based attacks. While no scripts were directly extracted, the OLE object structure strongly suggests an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000ba0.bin` `cf0eec8952adf22e0af1a451995ddd0d6714cb45bdac7fd009fcd167eeaef8b8`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xBA0	60528 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).
`objdata_01_off0001f807.bin` `ad7bf1923f855fca5949d0c557a2a819b106cd84b204870bcc59064eb0c6e331`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F807	2632 bytes
`objdata_02_off00020daa.bin` `44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x20DAA	12297 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.