RTF malware analysis — malicious · a74f7219f672e155

MALICIOUS

RTF

90.6 KB First seen: 2024-07-26

MD5: 02e73ef6a6bde5caa7628ee916111f60 SHA-1: 85fcd05b810401dffc45b6c2cb831787a8a131d3 SHA-256: a74f7219f672e155f20c501b9285630b07e70922c058fa3713c29012b8cbdb8c

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware that downloads and executes a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001da1.bin` `eb2fe46d36b5fdb4ce4223e7098ce2b535a3d5dbb9d0236839bcb42c1085c432`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DA1	1855 bytes

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