Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a7447db99ba60c2f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

39.6 KB Created: 2017-11-27 21:28:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: d2c54126b71a2439dfc384930580786c SHA-1: 7bb6eeba638aa0efcc0c29ebd4d8ba1e5a0fda7e SHA-256: a7447db99ba60c2f7bfd9e9bcfadfb05a4fc0ea214450b76ea85d386db1f727b
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The OOXML document contains an embedded OLE object that acts as a script dropper, specifically designed to download and execute a payload from the URL https://forum.cryptopia.gdn/sys.exe. The document body advertises a "Black Friday Sale" to entice users to interact with the malicious content. The presence of a VBScript extension in the dropped payload and the nature of the OLE object strongly suggest a malicious intent to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 6

  • Ole10Native package payload is a download-and-execute script critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_SCRIPT_DROPPER
    The OLE Package's embedded payload contains a script that hosts a shell (PowerShell/WScript/mshta), fetches a remote resource, and executes it — a download-and-run dropper. Embedding such a script inside an Office document via the Object Packager is a direct user-execution delivery technique (MITRE T1204.002), not a benign attachment.
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://forum.cryptopia.gdn/sys.exe Embedded OLE package script
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 5120 bytes
SHA-256: 5dcda88ea9544da5ecc2c39bf45fdecfa924ece8adefe6fedd00f504beb8155a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell" )
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2142 bytes
SHA-256: 2e9b97b59bfa5e896f3e76a3165d36ef56756033ae61fe6f32c49175a69f3f58
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell" )
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5352 bytes
SHA-256: a98e291138500445fc9829aa24ae87f1edf056947321f7023f7b67f924f049f4